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CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS OF PSYCHIATRY




The perennial conflict between members of the legal and
medical professions on the question of the relation of mental
abnormality to criminal responsibility is a matter of com-
mon knowledge. Every sensational trial, especially for a
capital offense, brings it again to the forefront and in almost
every book of an exclusively legal or medical character are
found spirited attacks against the views held by the opposing
group.1 The clash of opinion on this subject may perhaps
be best illustrated in the words of the participants them-
selves. Recently a well-known psychiatrist made the fol-
lowing statement:
" 'In the practical application of psychiatry to the problems of the
criminal law the prevalent concepts of tradition and long usage con-
flict sharply with psychiatric attitudes. Popular theories of retribu-
tion and established methods of dealing with offenders almost entirely
prevented a scientific envisagement of crime until recently when psy-
chiatrists, in spite of their original limitation of field, discovered and
demonstrated that types and trends of abnormal psychology extended
far out from the asylum into the court-room, school, and home. Psy-
chiatric experience and technique were found equally applicable to
the irascible employee, the retarded school child, the persistent stealer,
the compulsive drinker, the paranoid murderer and the textbook cases
of epilepsy, melancholia and schizophrenia. Faced with the legal par-
titions of misbehavior into insane and criminal psychiatrists found
themselves with no technical interest in nor agreement with these
partitions, but with a driving concern in all the unpropitious trends
of human character; with all acts, thoughts, emotions, instincts and
adaptations either socially or individually adverse. Some of these
constitute committable insanity, some do not; but all of them are
psychiatric problems.' "2
1 S. Sheldon Glueck, Mental Examination (1923) 14 Jour. Crim. Law 573.
2 Winfred Overholser, What Immediate Practical Contribution Can Psychia-
try Make to Criminal Law Administration? (1930) 55 Am. Bar Ass'n Rep. 594.
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As an antithesis to the picture thus portrayed, a state-
ment by a well-known judge in a recent book may be quoted:
" 'More solemn nonsense is being said and written concerning the
mentality of criminals than upon any other discussed subject. Man-
kind worships wonder-makers. The fortune teller, the voodoo man,
the prophet of the marvelous find followers in all lands, through all
ages. No fakir is quite successful who does not more than half be-
lieve in himself. Also, everyone stands for the excelling importance
of his own calling. Even the professional second story climber will
put up an argument to justify his business. The self-styled practical
psychologists, who dabble in the prisons and fret the courts, are neither
more nor less than, five times out of six, lineal descendants of the
women who told fortunes with cards. The practical psychologists are,
in the main, honest in their belief, while the fortune tellers only half
believe in themselves. Notwithstanding their general sincerity, the
first named will often fake a little to avoid being unjustly beaten on a
point. A good many officials in charge of courts, prisons, and parole
boards, work under the influence of their doctrine, that crime is the
result of mental deficiency. A more dangerous and pernicious teach-
ing could not invade the prison or the courtroom.'" 3
There is not another scientific field like this one of crimi-
nology where so many writers are found, expressing so many
wild speculations 4 and divergent opinions. Nor is the con-
flict a clear cut and well defined one, between two opposing
views, susceptible of any sort of rationalization or orderly
classification. Rather it is carried over into the opposing
factions themselves, increasing the confusion and permitting
the assertion of an united front only in the face of an attack
by the common enemy. So great is the confusion that Lord
Justice Blackburn stated before a committee of the House
of Commons:
" 'I have read every definition of insanity that I could meet and was
never satisfied with one of them; and have endeavored in vain to
make one satisfactory to myself. I verily believe it is not in human
power to do it.' "5
3 Op. cit. supra note 2.
4 John F. W. Meagher, Crime and Insanity (1926) 11 Va. L. Reg. 577.
5 Church and Petersen, Nervous and Mental Diseases (1915) 529.
"There is no satisfactory definition of insanity. It is essentially a compre-
hensive term, including in its general sense every form of mental derangement
whatever its source or cause, whether the mental condition is congenital or the
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Neither is the conflict limited to extra-judicial inquiry and
discussion,6 for the United States Supreme Court in an ad-
judicated case has stated that "opposite opinions of persons
professing to be experts may be obtained to any amount." 7
Meanwhile the impatience of the public with the experts,
the lawyers, the judges and with the law itself continues to
grow and the abuse of the press tends to become more and
more vitriolic.8
The problem of insanity in its relation to the administra-
tion of the criminal law may become important in one of
three respects, viz., insanity at the time that the offense was
committed, at the time of the trial, or at the time that the
result of arrested mental development or accident, or caused by physical disease,
dissipation, old age, or inherited." Wm. C. J. Meredith, Insanity as a Criminal
Defense (1931) 5.
6 "The experts who are called upon to give opinions in the course of the
litigation are dissatisfied with the conditions under which they must assist in
the administration of justice, are dissatisfied with the lawyers and the law,-and
the lawyers and the courts are dissatisfied with the experts." Roscoe Pound,
Address delivered at Minneapolis, Minn., June 7, 1928.
7 Winans v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 21. How. 88 (1852).
"The frequent spectacle of scientific experts differing in their opinions upon a
case according to the side on which they are retained tends much to discredit
such testimony or to impair its force and usefulness and inclines us to prefer the
formation of an opinion upon the real facts, when the case is not one beyond
the penetration and grasp of the ordinary mind." People v. Kemmler, 119 N. Y.
580, 583, 24 N. E. 9, 10 (1890).
"The defense of insanity has been so abused as to be brought into great dis-
credit. It has been the last resort in cases of unquestionable guilt, and has been
the excuse to juries for acquittal where their sympathy has been with the ac-
cused." Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161, 165 (1882).
"In spite of the disrepute of insanity pleas and insanity experts, it is likely
that there are many more insane, defective, and irresponsible persons who are
unjustly convicted of crime than there are guilty persons who succeed in escaping
by pretending insanity." Henry W. Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility (1919) 9
Jour. Crim. Law 485, 486.
"Common sense inferences and intelligent observation are more reliable as a
practical guide to the accomplishment of justice than the refined distinctions and
technical niceties of alienists and experts in psychopathic inferiority." Common-
wealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387, 152 N. E. 380 (1926).
8 "The public is gaining a vast distrust of the testimony of alienists in mur-
der trials. It is accustomed to set down this testimony as something that can be
purchased. And in a great measure this is true." Editorial, New York Evening
Post, quoted by Mental Hygiene, June, 1928.
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sentence is being carried out.9 Or, for present purposes,
it may be classified into insanity which exists at the time
of the alleged criminal act and that which comes into exist-
ence subsequently.' ° In the majority of cases, of course,
the insanity is permanent and is present on all three occa-
sions. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the
three situations in order to indicate the fundamental con-
cepts involved.
The presence or absence of insanity at the time the al-
leged act was committed involves the question of guilt or
criminal responsibility and is a problem for the lawyer. Its
presence subsequently does not involve the question of guilt
of the accused but rather the question whether or not the
law shall be carried out with respect to him. It is therefore
more properly a problem for the physician or penologist.
Insofar as the intervention of insanity after the commission
of the crime prevents the operation of the law by relieving
the accused of the liability to stand trial " or suffer the
execution of the sentence, it may be said to have a bearing
upon his responsibility to the criminal law. In the last
analysis there is no responsibility where the law does not
exact the penalty prescribed, whatever the reason for its
failure may be. However, the distinction between the two
cases is readily discernible where the accused subsequently
regains his sanity, for, where the insanity intervened, the
operation of the law was merely suspended, and he is then
required to stand trial or submit to the execution of the
sentence. In the case of insanity which existed at the time
of the act, the accused is discharged, from the institution
where he was being held for treatment, and allowed to go
9 Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane (1910) 1 Jour.
Crim. Law 394.
10 Glueck, Mental Examination (1923) 14 Jour. Cim. Law 573.
11 "No man shall be called upon to make his defense at a time when his
mind is in that condition that he does not appear capable of collecting together
his thoughts and modelling a defense." Freeman v. People, Denio (N. Y.)
9 (1874); Guagando v. People, 41 Tex. 626 (1874).
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entirely free in the same manner that any other committed
lunatic who had regained his sanity would be. In simpler
terms, the one problem goes to the existence or non-existence
of the crime 12 while the other goes to the liability to punish-
ment. The second is daily becoming more important and is
being more and more written upon and discussed. And in
many respects the problems are interwoven and common
to both questions, and any discussion of the one must nec-
essarily involve also a discussion of the other. However,
the lawyer is primarily concerned with the criminal respon-
sibility of the defective mentality, and it is that aspect of
the problem which is the main consideration here.
To obtain the viewpoint of the criminal law, an examina-
tion of the adjudicated cases is necessary, and such examina-
tion will afford a reasonably secure foundation for a predic-
tion of the result which the law will reach in a particular
case and under a particular fact situation. Such an exam-
ination reveals the sum total of all the fact situations in
which the law has been invoked against an individual of
alleged defective or deficient mentality. If any difference
of viewpoint exists with respect to the final disposition of
these cases a change must be contemplated or desired in
such disposition by the persons who hold the different view-
point. Hence any conflict between the law and psychiatry
must consist in the difference between the collected data on
the one hand as to when the law punishes and, on the other,
the collected opinions of those who would change the present
system, as to when the law ought to punish. A search into
what the law does in a given case necessarily involves the
purpose of the law in inflicting punishment, for until this is
known, there is no basis on which to proceed. No doubt,
action has preceded theorizing in human society; but this
12 "Insanity goes to the mental capacity of the defendant; unless he is sane
he is not guilty. Whatever reasonable doubts of his sanity there are, are reason-
able doubts of his guilt." J. B. White, Presumption of Malice and Insanity (1876)
3 Cent. L. Jour. 534.
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does not mean that the reasons for such action were not pres-
ent. They were merely unrecognized. The inquiry then
must extend to the question, "Why does the law punish?"
If any conflict of opinion exists its basis must be found in
the difference between the existing purpose of the law in
inflicting punishment, and the opinions of the critics of the
law on what that purpose ought to be. Hence there is pre-
sented the counter inquiry, "Why should the law punish?"
Moreover, in modern times, serious question has been raised
whether or not the law ought to punish at all. In simpler
terms, the motive of the law in reaching its results has been
questioned. The present inquiry, then consists in .an ex-
amination into the difference between the existing purpose
of societal action in the treatment of criminal conduct, and
the collected opinions indicating methods and purposes
which, it is hoped, would result in improvement.
II.
THE VIEWPOrNT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Theories of Punishment
Various theories as to the purpose of punishment have
been advanced at various times "3 and by various people.
Since the question is largely a metaphysical one based on
philosophical speculation and depending very greatly upon
the viewpoint of the individual himself and the particular
classification to which he belongs, 4 it is only natural that
13 For a history of the evolution of punishment see Gillin, Criminology and
Penology (1926) Ch. XV.
14 "The lawyer says that punishment is to compensate for damage and to
prevent further damage. The sociologist says that its purpose is to restore the
social equilibrium which has been disturbed and to prevent further disturbance.
The psychologist says that its purpose is to impress the mind of the person pun-
ished and of others to prevent repetition. The moralist says that it is to point
out to the offender the error of his way and to reform him. The priest says
it is to expiate his sin and make atonement. The physician says it is to eradicate
the plague spot in the mind of the criminal. The eugenist believes that it purifies
the race by eradicating the degenerative elements. The policeman says it is to
instill in the minds of the public a proper respect for the persons charged with
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some conflict and confusion should exist. Nevertheless, cer-
tain of these theories have been so persistently advanced that
they have attained the dignity of being considered the or-
thodox theories of punishment. These are: (1) The theory
of Expiation, (2) The theory of Reformation, (3) The
theory of Prevention, and (4) The theory of Retribution.
Under the theory of expiation it is thought that the
moral law which the criminal has outraged, asserts itself
against him to make him realize that he has done wrong, and
to expiate his offense;'" that in the very nature of the moral
universe there is a necessary correlation between guilt and
pain and that one who has done wrong must make atone-
ment, by having pain inflicted upon him. The difficulties
encountered under this theory are too great and too numer-
ous to allow it to be accepted. The primary difficulty is
that as a practical matter it is an impossible task to ad-
minister punishment in proportion to moral guilt because this
would require a penetration of the mind and will, its badness
and motives. The thoughts of men, however, are not open
to other men and no judge is able to ascertain the degree
of moral depravity in the culprit before him.'6 Moreover,
it would be impossible to regulate the amount of pain which
punishment causes in fact because this depends upon the
personality and temperament of the person on whom it is
inflicted. The theory of expiation is an attempt to carry
concepts of Divine law as contained in theology and re-
ligion into the field of imperfect human law, and is futile
because it cannot function as a practical rule for guidance
in the treatment of crime. In many instances, rules of law
differ from the concepts of ethics, in some cases not going as
law enforcement. The soldier regards it as a public rejoicing over an enemy of
general interest. And the criminal himself considers it a fee stipulated for the
doing of the act." McConnell, Criminal Responsibility and Social Constraint
(1913) 2.
15 McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 6.
16 This difficulty led to the clarification of the difference between sin and
crime. Gillin, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 318.
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far and in others passing beyond the moral code. Further-
more, under this theory it would be necessary to visit the
same punishment upon the unsuccessful attempt to commit
crime or upon the mere intent to do so, as upon the con-
summated crime, for the sin is just as great. As a practical
matter this not only is not done 7 but cannot be done be-
cause of the impossibility of making the necessary proof.
Under the theory of reformation it is thought that punish-
ment is designed to effect the betterment and cure of those
who come under its operation. 8 It is thought that the
criminal is abnormal and that by the operation of the law
upon his mind, his cure may be effected. 9 Punishment
under this theory aims at the artificial creation of circum-
stances conducive to moral improvement in a temporary
good environment supplied by the state. It is known that
hardship does in some cases have the effect of improving
the moral tone of the individual, and punishment has the
advantage over ordinary misfortune in that it is seen by the
culprit to have a causal connection with wrong doing.
Although punishment in many cases does have the effect
on which the claims of the reformative theory are based,2"
great difficulties are again encountered when it is attempted
to rationalize all punishment on the basis of this theory.
Capital punishment cannot be justified under this view and
it would be absurd to attempt to reconcile the destruction
of the offender with the theory that his punishment is meted
out, for the purpose of reforming him. Nor can the punish-
ment of the incorrigible offender, or the fixing of the penalty
according to the enormity of the offense be justified. In the
17 "If a man takes an umbrella from a stand, intending to steal it, but finds
that it is his own, he commits a crime." Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (12th
ed.) 33.
18 McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, Ch. IV.
19 Kenny, op. cit. supra note 17, Ch. II.
20 "As a result of the experiments of the penologist Brockway it may be
regarded as scientifically proved that the disease of criminality can be cured."
McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 93.
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first case the punishment must admittedly fail in its purpose
and in the second, if reformation were the basis, the punish-
ment would be inflicted, not according to the crime but ac-
cording to the need to effect the reformation. Furthermore,
this view would require the punishment of all who were
morally bad, whether they broke the law or not, and would
excuse those who were not morally bad even though they
had broken the law. Certainly, under this theory there is
no need for punishment where there is no need for reform.
In the first instance it is open to the same objections with
respect to motives and moral depravity which are advanced
against the theory of expiation, and in the second it runs
counter to the accepted practice in the treatment of acts
which are merely malum prohibitum.2" Lastly, experience
has shown that punishment does not reform in the majority
of cases and whatever claims 2 are made for the theory, they
must yield in the face of the fact that in practice it is both
unsound and untrue.23
The theory that punishment is inflicted as a preventive
measure is three-fold in its application. It operates, in the
first place, upon the offender himself to prevent his repeti-
tion of the offense by disabling him through confinement or
execution to have the opportunity to repeat. Secondly, it
operates to inspire him with terror of the law as a result of
his own experience and thus deters the repetition of the of-
fense. And, thirdly, it operates, by reason of the example
which the law makes of his case, to deter others from com-
mitting crime. Under this theory punishment is not an end
in itself but a means of attaining an end. It is inflicted
21 "Offenses which are merely malum prohibitum are such acts as are in
themselves indifferent and become right or wrong, just or unjust according to
legislation." Bouvier, Law Dictionary (1928).
22 Osborne holds to the view that the real aim of modern penology is refor-
mation. Thomas Mott Osborne, Society and Prisons (1916).
23 "Reform of the criminal does not occupy the first place in any scheme
of punishments now existing. No scheme of punishment is primarily adapted to
that end. It is an afterthought and one of recent introduction." Mercier, Crim-
inal Responsibility (1926) 35.
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not because wrong was done, but that wrong may not be
done. It is under this theory that mutilation of the body
was practiced to furnish a living and continuous example
of the authority and majesty of the law. The adherents of
this theory are numerous,24 and undoubtedly some weight is
to be attached to their claims. Some of the applications
of the criminal law can be explained on no other theory.
Yet, it also is open to serious objections.
Insofar as punishment disables the offender by confine-
ment or execution, it does prevent the repetition of crime.
Yet a serious question arises whether this disablement is
the reason for the punishment or merely a result of it. In
the case where punishment is inflicted in the form of a fine,
the penalty admittedly does not disable. In the case of
confinement the disablement continues only for the period of
the sentence and it is impossible to justify the freeing of
recidivists under this view. Neither does it justify the pun-
ishment inflicted for crimes of passion or upon penitent of-
fenders, both being cases where there is no danger of repeti-
tion. If the theory be that punishment inspires terror in
the offender and thus prevents crime, both the penitent of-
fender and the absolutely incorrigible one should go free.
In the one case there is no need for punishment. In the
other it is useless since it will only increase the hatred for
the law in the individual whom punishment cannot pos-
sibly tame.25
When the viewpoint is shifted and the deterrence of others
is regarded as the aim of punishment, these difficulties are
obviated but others are substituted. If example were the
underlying basis, the punishment should be designed to fit
24 Salmond regards deterrence as the main end in view and all other as
merely accessory. Salmond, jurisprudence (8th ed.) 121 et. seq.
Bentham contended that example is the most important end of all. Bentham,
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
"Most authorities still regard the deterrent effect as the chief aim of punish-
ment." John F. W. Meagher, Crime and Insanity (1926) 11 Va. Law. Reg. 577.
25 McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, Ch. III.
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the enormity and diffusion of the temptation to commit
crime rather than the enormity of the offense, and the lesser
crimes should be visited with the greater penalties while
the more heinous should be treated leniently until the point
was reached where a crime which had no possibility of imi-
tation and could allure a single perpetrator only would go
unpunished.26 Obviously such a gradation of penalties is
impossible. Assuming the deterrent theory of punishment to
be the correct one, if the penalties were adjusted according
to the diffusion of the temptation to commit crime, the effect
would be, not to eliminate crime but to substitute a new
class of "lesser crimes" toward which the temptation would
become greater. The result is a circuity of argument which
leads nowhere. Moreover, if deterrence were the aim, not
only would punishment be inflicted in public but it would
be widely publicised in order to bring it to the knowledge
of the greatest possible number of people. Yet this is con-
trary both to the course of historical development and to the
practice of the present day.
Where there is no reason to inflict punishment for the
purpose of either disablement or deterrence of the individual
himself, it is unjust to require him to suffer. This conten-
tion is met by the argument that the suffering of the in-
dividual is necessary for the benefit of society as a whole
and is therefore justifiable. But to carry this argument to
its logical conclusion would be to require the punishment of
all persons who by heredity, environment, or exposure to
temptation, were potential criminals, in order to impress up-
on them the majesty of the law and to prevent them from
following their natural inclinations. There would be no
necessity to withhold punishment until the crime had been
consummated. Yet the horror with which such a sugges-
26 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 36.
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tion is met" must indicate that some other theory of crimi-
nal punishment is the underlying and primary basis. It
might be pointed out, further, that under this theory the
same penalty should be attached to the unsuccessful at-
tempt as to the consummated crime for in both cases the
offender is equally dangerous to the community, but practi-
cally, this is not done. And, lastly, experience has shown
that punishment deters neither the offender himself nor
others.28
Under the theory of punishment for retribution, punitive
suffering is inflicted upon the criminal as an act of justice,
because he merits it, to compensate for evil done.29 Under
this theory punishment is not inflicted as a means of attain-
ing an end but is itself the end to be attained."0 It is pun-
ishment for the sake of punishment and embodies the rule
in the law of Moses,"' "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth." 32 Reciprocity being considered the fundamental
27 In an experiment to discover the attitude toward punishment, hypotheti-
cal questions were submitted to students of the University of Wisconsin under
such fact situations as to eliminate all but the particular theory to' be tested.
In one experiment the students were taken from a class where the social good
was advocated as the only excuse for punishment by an eminent professor. Yet
the sacrifice of the individual for the public good was in almost every instance
required to be reinforced by indignation against wrongdoing before the subjects
could be induced to favor it. Sharp and Otto, Retribution and Deterrence (1910)
20 Inter. Jour. of Ethics 438.
28 Henderson, Ethical Problems (1910) 20 Inter. Jour. of Ethics 284;
Dwight G. McCarty, Mental Defectives (1929) 14 Ia. Law. Rev. 401.
20 McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, Ch. II.
30 "Current opinion inclines to think that justice requires that a man who
has done wrong ought to suffer pain in return, even if no benefit result to him
or others." Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (1907) 280.
31 Exodus, xxi, 23-28.
32 "Disobedience was the result experienced by the Creator and punishment
the result experienced by the first offenders. Man's first disobedience therefore
brought with it his first knowledge of the law of retribution. That the first
punishment inflicted was not corrective may be inferred from the fact that it
was inflicted not alone upon the principals and their accessory but upon their
descendants for all time, even the earth being thenceforth accursed. Whether
man's first contact with an arbitrary will has no greater support than a mere
allegorical conception, or is in fact a Divine revelation from the Creator, the
influence that it has exerted upon mankind is clearly recognizable." Charles Kerr,
The Law of Avenge (1927) 14 Va. Law Rev. 265.
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principle of morality, the only requirement for punishment
under this theory is the doing of a wrongful act. 3 Retri-
bution takes precedence not only in age but in importance to
all other theories. 34 Retributive punishment is the order of
all nature and primitive man shared with animals the emo-
tion of resentment at injury and the tendency to retaliate.
In its origin, legal punishment is vindicative for in early times
punishment took the form of private vengeance such as the
blood feud and trial by battle in England.3" As society
developed, the wergild was substituted as an alternative
remedy 36 but where it was out of reach of the accused or
the injured party refused to accept, the law left the culprit
to be slain. As the sanction of the law developed, the state
exacted the penalty but the retributive force was not de-
stroyed. 7
The theory of retribution as the basis for punishment is
very generally condemned as being unworthy of either the
individual or the state, because it serves no useful purpose
and because man should be guided by his intelligence rather
than his emotions. Seldom are these contentions supported
by reasoned argument. Nor can the law, either in its ori-
gin or in its present practice be explained in any other way.
The condemnations are in reality expressions of opinion on
what the purpose of the law should be in dealing with crimi-
nal conduct rather than the existing purpose. No other
theory may be advanced to explain the sentiment that pun-
ishment should be just. On no other theory can the mitiga-
33 History recalls the infliction of punishment upon animals and even upon
inanimate objects. E. P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of
Animals (1906).
34 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 37.
35 The same is true under other systems of law. Thus Abner was slain by
Joab in revenge for the blood of Asahel. II Samuel, ii., 3.
The city of Bibeah was destroyed for the murder of a concubine of a mem-
ber of the tribe of Israel. Judges, xix., 20.
36 The Hebrews also practiced the payment to the injured party of a money
composition for crime. Exodus, xxi., 18, 19, 30.
37 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 38, 39.
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tion of punishment because of extenuating circumstances, or
the fixed penalty, inflicted according to the gravity of the
offense, be upheld. The passionate emotion into which the
community is thrown at the news of a horrible crime, and
the resulting manhunt, indicate the desire for satisfaction of
the outraged sense of justice. This sense of justice is in-
stinctive in man and no amount of training will suffice to
instil rationality into an instinctive emotion.3" It is natural
to enjoy seeing virtue rewarded and wrongdoing punished.
In fact it is upon this instinct that the entire pleasure de-
rived from fiction and drama is based. Punishment is 11
and always has been the result of the sense of moral justice
and the law punishes because the acts are considered moral-
ly wrong.4" The objections which are advanced against the
other theories of punishment disappear when the theory of
retribution is considered as the primary basis. Except in
one instance-the infliction of punishment for acts which
are merely malum prohibitum-every application of the
criminal law may be explained on this theory.4 '
38 John Alan Hamilton, Making Punishment Fit the Crime (1922) 12 Jour.
Crim. Law 159.
39 "Even today with all our enlightened and humane concepts there is a
popular demand for more severe punishment. Cold-blooded murders and brutal
crimes of all kinds inflame the public. Hanging and the electric chair are still
resorted to for convicted murderers, but murder continues and these horrible ex-
amples are not effective deterrents. The public still demands more severe and
effective punishment to combat the crime wave and our criminal system is de-
clared ineffective because punishment is not swift and sure enough." Dwight G.
McCarty, op. cit. supra note 28.
"In the experiments of Professors Sharp and Otto at the University of Wis-
consin, seventy-six out of a hundred of the subjects could be induced to favor
punishment for the sake of punishment in one hypothetical question or another.
Retribution and Deterrence, 20 Int. Jour. of Ethics 438.
40 "Punishment faithfully reflects the emotion of social resentment. When-
ever the offense inspires less horror than the punishment awarded it, the rigor
of the penal law is obliged to give way to the common feelings of mankind."
Gibbon, Westermarck, Vol. i, p. 199.
41 "The state virtually says to the criminal or prospective criminal, 'Do
what you like. I lie low and wait until you have committed an offense. Then
I come down on you and do what I consider my duty. I cannot prevent you
from doing wrong; you are a free agent. But neither am I at liberty to alter
the consequences of your choice. For my line of conduct is but the necessary
moral complement of your conduct.'" Openheimer, Rationale of Punishment
(1913) 267, 268.
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In the case of acts which are not wrong in themselves but
merely illegal, the primary basis of punishment is admittedly
deterrence. The underlying principle is that the acts, al-
though not wrong, are socially undesirable and hence pun-
ishment is attached to prevent them. Even here it is evi-
dent that the distinction between the two classes of crimes
is really only a matter of degree. As time goes on and the
recognition of their social undesirability becomes more and
more firmly established the acts will become morally wrong.
Here again the greater penalties are attached to the acts
which are considered the more socially harmful so that re-
tributive punishment may be said in a way to reinforce
deterrent punishment. Except in this case, however, it is
probably true that retribution is the primary aim and the
other purposes of criminal punishment are only incidental.
B. Criminal Responsibility
If retribution is the basis of punishment and the reason
why the law punishes, it follows that penalties may be in-
flicted only in cases of guilt. The law must be just, since
it mirrors the social sense of justice, and the innocent must
not be made to suffer. Hence the law can punish when and
only when an act is committed which is wrongful in the
eyes of society. In order to be wrongful an act must be
first of all, harmful to others for no matter how undesirable
it may in some cases be considered, no punishment attaches
for acts which concern only the actor himself.42 Wrongful-
ness here is the wider term and all wrongful acts are harm-
ful, although the converse is not necessarily true.
On the surface it would seem that this contention is not
borne out in at least one class of cases-suicide and at-
tempted suicide. In effect, however, these cases actually
illustrate the operation of the rule. Where the person com-
mitting or attempting to commit suicide has dependents,
obviously there is detriment both to them and to the con-
42 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 81 et seq.
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munity upon which they are thrown for support. More-
over, the common law crime of suicide is based upon the
early conception that the state is interested in the life and
welfare of its citizens for the purposes of taxation, defense,
and productivity. To deprive the state of its citizens, is to
perpetuate an act harmful to the state.43 Hence the law in-
flicted its penalty in such cases where the wrongdoer was
not successful in his attempt, and the law could act. And
in the case where the suicide was successful the law never-
theless exacted its due in the ignominy of a criminal death
and the resulting forfeiture of property. It is interesting to
note that where the more modern view prevails and the doc-
trine that the individual exists for the benefit of the state has
been repudiated, suicide is held not to be a crime.44
The distinction between wrongfulness and harmfulness
is borne out in the practical administration of the criminal
law and is indicated by the justifications which the law
allows to be interposed as defenses to some harmful acts.
In cases where acts are committed in furtherance of public
justice such as executions,45 and arrests,46 in furtherance of
domestic authority,4" for the prevention of crime,4" in self-
defense,49 in defense of others,50 and in defense of property,5
there is no doubt but that harm results, and yet no punish-
ment is inflicted because the moral sense of society is not
outraged; in effect the acts are not considered wrong.
43 Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); McMahon v. State, 168 Ala. 70,
53 So. 89 (1910); Turner v. State, 119 Tenn. 663, 108 $. W. 1139 (1907).
44 People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690 (1920); Blackburn v.
State, 23 Oh. St. 146 (1872); Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 193, 69 S. W. 529
(1902).
45 Mercier, o*. cit. supra note 23, at p. 86.
46 U. S. v. Rice, 1 Hughes 560, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 153 (1875).
47 2 Kent Comm. 203; 1 BI. Comm. 452.
48 Story v. State, 71 Ala. 329 (1882).
49 Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193 (1849).
50 Saylor v. Comm, 97 Ky. 184, 30 S. W. 390 (1895); Snell v. State, 29
Tex. App. 236, 15 S. W. 722 (1890).
51 State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873) ; Story v. State, op. cit. supra note 48.
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However, justification for harmful acts is not unlimited
license and when the harm attempted to be justified is the
result of excessive force unreasonably applied, the justifica-
tion fails and criminal responsibility attaches.52
A further requisite of wrongful conduct is that it be in-
tentional. Under the retributive theory of punishment the
idea of moral wickedness is interwoven with that of legal
crime. Hence to constitute a crime " and subject the of-
fender to liability to punishment, or, to constitute legal
criminal guilt, there must be present a mental as well as a
physical element. 4 Markby and Salmond go farther and
require the volitional element in their definition of an act,55
but whether it is required as one of the elements of an act
or as a necessary complement to constitute an act a crime
can make little practical difference. This volitional ele-
ment is known as the mens rea or guilty mind and is nec-
essary to every crime.56 It is based on the underlying con-
cept of free will in the determination of conduct and re-
flects the natural feeling that it is both impolitic and unjust
to make a man answerable in a case where he could not have
chosen otherwise.57 Hence it follows that if, when the voli-
tional element is absent there is no crime, the accused should
be allowed to disprove his guilt by showing the absence of
mens rea. This is, in fact, the case since evidence is ad-
missible to disprove intent 8 and the presence or absence
52 Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169, 7 So. 268 (1889); State v. Terrel, 55 Utah
314, 186 Pac. 108 (1919).
53 "It is alike the general rule of law and the dictate of natural justice
that to constitute the guilt there must not only be an act but a criminal inten-
tion." People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 267 (1891).
54 Kenny, op. cit. supra note 17, Ch. III.
55 Markby, Elements of Law (3rd ed.) § 215; Salmond, jurisprudence (2nd
ed.) 527.
56 4 BI. Comm. 20; The Queen v. Tolson [1889] L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 168;
Kenny, op. cit. supra note 17, at p. 40.
57 Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 54.
58 People v. Flack, op. cit. supra note 53; Filkins v. People 69 N. Y. 101
(1887).
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of intent is a fact question for the jury." Where there is
no will to do the act because the party cannot know the
nature of it, as for instance in the case of infancy 10 or som-
nambulism,6 1 responsibility does not attach. The same is
true where the will is not directed to the deed as in the case
of a mistake of fact.62 The third class of cases in which acts
which are ordinarily considered wrongful do not result in
crime is the situation where the freedom of choice is removed
because the will is overcome by compulsion. This class in-
cludes public compulsion, such as acts committed in the
course of warfare or under court order,63 coercion,64 and acts
committed because of the driving force of necessity.65
In some cases the law does attach criminal responsibility
to acts which result in harm, although no harm was in-
tended, on the ground that there is an inference that a party
intends the results which are the immediate and natural
consequence of his acts.66 There is, therefore, at least a
prima facie presumption of intent, which arises from the
doing of the act.67 It is on this theory that responsibility
59 People v. Flack, op. cit. supra note 53.
60 Under the age of seven there is a conclusive presumption of the lack
of inens rea. Between the ages of seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption and over the age of fourteen full criminal responsibility. Kenny, op. cit.
supra note 17, Ch. IV; Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858); State v. Arnold,
35 N. C. 173 (1851).
61 "Can anyone doubt that a man who ... committed what would otherwise
be a crime in a state of somnambulism would be entitled to be acquitted? And
why is this? Simply because he would not know what he was doing." Mr.
Justice Stephen, The Queen v. Tolson, op. cit. supra note 56, at p. 187.
62 State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 Pac. 259 (1888); State v. McDonald,
7 Mo. App. 510 (1879).
63 Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205 (1907); 1 U. S. Comp. Stat. 592.
64 Bish, Crim. Law (9th ed.) § 359; Com. v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152 (1813);
Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85 (1866).
65 U. S. v. Ashton, 2 Summ. (U. S.) 13 (1834); 1 Hawkins P. C. Ch. 28,
§ 26.
60 Rex. v. Holt, 7 Cas. & P. 518 (1826); Rex. v. Hunt, 1 Moody Cr. Cas.
93 (1825); Reg. v. Franklin, 15 Cox C. C. 163 (1883).
67 Jeff. v. State, 39 Miss. 593 (1860); Filkins v. People, op. cit. supra note
58; State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361 (1833); Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292,
87 So. 920 (1921).
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attaches for negligent 68 and wanton '9 acts and the volition-
al element is supplied by the intent to do the act rather than
by an intentional seeking of harmful results. In such cases
there really is a presence of guilt because even though there
is no intent to inflict the particular harm which results,
the negligent, reckless or unlawful act is itself considered
wrongful.
However, in the case of acts which are merely malum
prohibitum and not wrong in the moral sense, the element
of guilt from a moral standpoint is not required to be pres-
ent as a pre-requisite to criminal responsibility. In such
case the crime does not rest in the doing of the act with an
evil intent but in the doing of the act.7" The situation is
analogous to liability without fault in tort or the applica-
tion of an objective rather than a subjective test in the con-
struction of a contract. Here deterrence is the avowed basis
of punishment. Even here, however, retribution must come
to the assistance of deterrence inasmuch as it is necessary
that the doing of the act itself be intentional "' and if deter-
rence were the only aim, mere proof of the act would be
sufficient to warrant the penalty.
In general, then, it may be said, as Mercier put it: 71
"Responsibility attaches to acts which are wrong and no others. A
wrong act is a voluntary act in which the actor seeks gratification by
inflicting harm upon others and responsibility is the more undoubted,
the more closely, the more deliberately, the more frequently the will
is concerned in the act. Therefore to incur responsibility by a harmful
act, the actor must will the act, intend the harm, and desire primarily
his own gratification. Furthermore, the act must be unprovoked and
the actor must know and appreciate the circumstances in which the act
is done."
68 Bradley v. People, 8 Colo. 601, 9 Pac. 783 (1885); Comm. v. York, 9
Metc. (Mass.) 93 (1845); Comm. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1893).
69 Vandermark v.'People, 47 Ill. 122 (1868).
70 Comm. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173 (1861); People v. Powell, 63
N. Y. 88 (1875).
71 Stephen, History of Criminal Law (1883) Vol. II, p. 97.
72 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 176.
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C. Insanity
The foregoing discussion has developed the necessity of
the volitional element to constitute a criminal act, as well as
the reason for it. It was indicated that where the mens
rea is lacking because of the immaturity of the offender, the
defense of infancy may be successfully interposed to crimi-
nal prosecution and an acquittal obtained because no crime
has in fact been committed. However, it is evident that
the absence of the volitional element may arise as well from
a morbid or diseased condition of the mind as from imma-
turity and when such a condition does in fact exist, there
is no crime.7" This is the basis of insanity as a defense to
crime and goes to the question of capacity. In the same
manner the question of insanity is raised to challenge the
capacity to execute a contract or testamentary document.
In these analogous cases the same result is reached, that is,
the very existence of the will or contract is denied.
The English law has from early times recognized insanity
as a possible defense to crime and various legal tests to
determine the irresponsibility of the insane have been pro-
posed by judges from time to time since the early common
law. The "counting twenty pence" test of Fitzherbert in
the sixteenth century,74 the "fourteen year old child" test of
Hale,7 5 the "wild beast" test of Judge Tracy in Arnold's
Case in 1724,76 and the "insane delusion" test brought into
prominence by the brilliant advocacy of Erskine in Had-
field's Case,77 have all been discarded along with many defini-
tions and ideas of insanity and mental weakness put forward
73 "There must be two constituent elements of legal responsibility in the
commission of every crime and no rule can be just and reasonable which fails
to recognize either of them: (1) capacity of intellectual discrimination and (2)
freedom of will." Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
"Sanity is an ingredient in crime as essential as the overt act, and if sanity
is wanting there is no crime." Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 352, 358 (1866).
74 1 Hawkins P. C. 2.
75 1 Hale P. C. 13, 15.
76 Rex. v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
77 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800).
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in various decisions during this early period. In their place
the "knowledge of right and wrong" test contained in the
McNaughton rules of 1843 was established. The McNaugh-
ton rules were laid down by the Judges of England in answer
to questions propounded to them by the House of Lords
after the acquittal of Daniel McNaughton 7 on a plea of
insanity had resulted in a heated debate on the subject.
In effect, the McNaughton rules laid down the require-
ments, which have by the force of time and precedent be-
come crystallized into the legal concept, that to establish
a defense on the ground of insanity it is necessary to prove
that at the time of committing the act, the accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was committing, or if he did know that, not to know that
what he was doing was wrong. The requirement of con-
sciousness to establish criminal responsibility extends not
only to knowledge that the act is one which he ought not
to do but that it is contrary to the law of the land. This
test has reference not to the knowledge of right and wrong
in the abstract, but with respect to the particular act com-
mitted. It is evident that under this test not every and
all instances of insanity will excuse the commission of crime.
If, when the act was committed, the accused had sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature and quality of
the act and to know that it was wrong,79 he is generally
78 10 Clark & T. 200 (1843).
79 "There is no law which will excuse or palliate a deliberate murder on
the ground that the perpetrator of it is unlearned, passionate, ignorant, or even
of weak mind, unless the weakness of mind amounts to such a defect of reason
as to render him incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act, or if
he does know it, that he does not know that it is wrong to commit it." Fitz-
patrick v. Comm., 81 Ky. 357 (1883).
"All that was suggested was that he (the accused) was more ignorant and
somewhat more stupid than common men; of bad education, bad passions, and
bad habits. Now these are precisely the common causes of crimes, but certainly
they form no legal excuse or justification for the commission of them." U. S. v.
Cornell, 2 Mason (U. S.) 91, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 868 (1820).
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responsible for the commission of the act, whatever may
be his capacity in other particulars.8"
In the United States various tests have been adopted to
determine the criminal responsibility of insane persons ac-
cused of crime and it is not unnatural that with forty-nine
tribunals of last resort, some confusion should exist. In
general the cases fall into three groups although there are
some further slight variations. In the first of these are
included those states which have adopted the "right and
wrong" test as laid down in the McNaughton rules and
which have limited the defense of insanity to those cases
where the accused does not have the required knowledge.
This is the so-called New York rule 8" and defines moral
wrong as well as legal wrong with respect to the particular
act.82
A second group, while recognizing the "right and wrong"
test of the McNaughton rules, does not limit the defense to
knowledge only but recognizes the defense of moral in-
sanity or irresistible impulse. This is known as the Mass-
achusetts rule and is based on the idea that the required
mental element of a crime may be lacking as well through
the loss of the power of control 83 as through the impair-
ment of the intellectual or reasoning faculties and that crimi-
nal responsibility depends not only on the possession of
80 State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 33 Pac. 287 (1893).
81 Edwin R. Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility (1917) 30 Har.
L. Rev. 724.
"A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic,
or insane person, except upon proof that at the time of committing the act he
was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing or not to know that it was wrong." N. Y. Penal
Law (1909) § 1120.
82 "A person is not insane who knows right from wrong and that the
act which he is committing is a violation of law and wrong in itself." Willis v.
People, 32 N. Y. 715, 719 (1865).
83 "Insanity may not only affect the understanding but control the power of
volition and a limitation of the question of insanity to understanding is objection-
able." Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492 (1870).
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will but upon the power over it.8 4  Insane impulse is known
among medical writers as "lesion of the will," 85 and the sit-
uation is considered analogous to those cases where the will
is overborne by compulsion as in the case of coercion, force,
or driving necessity. In such case the act cannot in reality
be considered the act of the person who does it. Rather, it
is thought that he is only the innocent instrumentality," by
which the act is carried out, in the grip of a greater force
which is really the responsible agency. This also is the
basis for the attempted defenses on the ground of hypnotism
but in that case it is not admitted that the will may be so
overcome. It is evident that in order for insanity to be
a defense in this situation it must be shown to exist with
such violence as to render it impossible for the accused
to do otherwise than yield.8" As in the case of compulsion,
so here, it is not sufficient that the course of conduct be
highly desirable or advantageous. 8 It must in fact be nec-
essary by removing the power of choice entirely.
The third group of cases denies the utility of any specific
and universal legal test and holds that in all cases the ques-
tion to be decided is whether the diseased condition and the
crime are so inseparably connected in a cause and effect
relationship that the latter may be considered as solely the
84 In the case of irresistible impulse "'the act was not the act of a volun-
tary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without concurrence of a mind
directing it.'" Comm. v. Cooper, 219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N. E. 545, 547 (1914).
85 Meredith, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 60 et seq.
86 "If one accused of a criminal act knows it to be wrong he is equally
irresponsible whether his will is overcome and his hand used by the irresistible
impulse of his own mental disease or by the irresistible power of another person.
If his mental, moral, and bodily strength is subjugated and pressed into an invol-
untary service, it is immaterial whether it is done by disease or by another man,
or any other force set in operation without any fault on his part.' State v.
Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869).
87 Taylor v. Comm., 109 Pa. 262 (1885); Scott v. Comm., 4 Het. (Ky.)
227 (1863).
88 Respujblica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 86 (1781); U. S. v. Holmes, 1
Wall., Jr., (U. S.) 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 383 (1842).
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product of the former.8 9 Under this rule the only question
to be considered is that of proximate cause and if this is
found to be the diseased condition of the mind, the accused
is not criminally responsible, irrespective of whatever other
factors may exist.
Although the tests vary, it is evident that whatever the
test applied, insanity does not in every instance excuse crimi-
nal conduct. However, in some cases where it does not
excuse entirely, the diseased condition may be interposed to
reduce the degree of the crime 9 and thus mitigate the
penalty. For instance, although homicide is not excused,
the accused may be found guilty of manslaughter instead
of murder because of the absence of deliberation. 91 A simi-
lar instance of the application of this rule may be found in
the case of voluntary intoxication. As a general rule drunk-
enness is not an excuse for crime9 and legally the person
who commits a crime while under the influence of liquor is
generally in the same position with respect to criminal re-
sponsibility as any other person, if not worse.9" This is
quite in accord with the general attitude of the law with
respect to criminal responsibility. Since drunkenness is
wrong both morally and legally, the intention to drink and
become intoxicated is sufficient basis for the liability of the
accused for the consequences, just as the intention to com-
mit other wrongful acts is sufficient basis for responsibility
for unforseen results. It is not unnatural that the law does
not allow one wrongful act to be set up as a defense to an-
other. However, if the intoxication is so excessive that
89 Parsons v. State, op. ci. supra note 73; State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369
(1871).
0 Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876); State v. Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86
At]. 590 (1913); Weihofen, Partial Insanity (1930) 24 Ill. Law Rev. 505, 515.
91 Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 218 (1860).
92 U. S. v. King, 34 Fed. 302 (1888); U. S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed. 127 (1882);
Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927).
93 The earlier cases treated drunkenness as an aggravation rather than a
matter in mitigation. Beverly's Case, 4 Coke 125 (1803); Marshall's Case, 1
Lewin C. C. 76 (1830) ; Rex. v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817 (1837).
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actual insanity supervenes, it may be raised in defense, for
a person insane at the time the act was committed cannot
be convicted of crime, whether the insanity is caused by
drunkenness or otherwise.9" Where the intention to com-
mit the crime is proved not to have been formed before the
drinking, and the crime was committed during a state of
intoxication, then the confused mental state accompanying
intoxication is taken into account secondarily on such ques-
tions as premeditation, deliberation and malice, not in de-
fense, but to show that the lesser and not the greater crime
was committed. 5
The question of insanity as bearing upon criminal respon-
sibility is in all cases a question of fact for the jury to decide,
and since the law is interested in the question of responsi-
bility with respect to the particular act and not in insanity
per se, each case is to be decided on its own facts only.
A presumption exists that all men are sane and therefore the
accused is presumed to be sane until a prima facie doubt has
been raised. Then the burden is on the state to prove san-
ity. Although there is a presumption, where habitual,
chronic or continuous insanity is once proved to exist, that
this condition continues until the contrary is shown,96 it is
not conclusive, and even a court order committing the ac-
cused to an insane asylum just prior to the crime, does
not relieve the jury of the question of criminal responsi-
bility.97
In order to assist the jury to arrive at their decision, the
mental expert or the psychiatrist is called in. His duty in
court is simply to discover the mental condition of the ac-
94 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard [1920] L. R. App. Cas. 479.
95 Cheadle v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 566, 149 Pac. 919 (1915); Whitten v.
State, 115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483 (1896).
96 State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873); Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170,
11 So. 618 (1892); Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 (1884); State v. Reddick,
7 Kan. 143 (1884).
97 People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124 (1907).
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cused.98 After an examination of the accused, as well as
his life history and antecedents, the expert submits his evi-
dence as to the state of sanity or insanity; " but the evidence
must be based on symptoms and circumstances which come
within his own observation or are testified to by others, and
mere speculations of the medical expert as to probabilities
are not admissible.100  While the evidence submitted by
the expert may be given more weight by the jury because of
the detailed knowledge from which he speaks and the quali-
fications which entitle his statements to greater considera-
tion, it is not binding upon either the court or the jury, but
is to be received along with evidence of prior committments,
eccentricities and all the facts and circumstances of the
case, to enable the jury to decide whether or not, in the
particular case, the insanity is of such nature as to relieve
the accused of criminal responsibility.
Looking then to the viewpoint of the law, the following
general propositions may be said to set out the situation as
it now exists:
(1) The Criminal law has been historical rather than
logical in its origin and development.
(2) Being historical, it has followed more or less closely
the social development of mankind as well as his
natural and instinctive tendencies.
(3) Because of this connection, the underlying and pri-
mary purpose of the law is retributive justice.
(4) Retributive punishment, based as it is on moral
justice and the guilt of the party accused, or of'
wrong doing, requires all crimes of a certain nature
to be treated in a certain way, resulting in the fixed
penalty.
08 Charles W. Burr, Paranoia, Its Varieties and Importance (1907) 48 Jour.
Am. Med. Ass'n. (1852) 1858.
99 Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120 (1866).
100 Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law (1924) 393.
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(5) When there are facts present which remove the ele-
ment of guilt or wrongdoing, no responsibility at-
taches.
(6) Insanity is such a fact and the actor is excused,
(a) In all jurisdictions when it impairs the knowl-
edge of right or wrong or the nature of the
act committed;
(b) In some jurisdictions when it impairs the con-
trol of the will over the body;
(c) And in still others when it is the proximate
cause of the act.
(7) The question of the presence or absence of insanity
is a fact question for the jury and the purpose of
evidence, of whatever nature it may be, is merely
to assist the jury in arriving at the correct result.
III.
THE VIEWPOINT OF PSYCHIATRY
As has already been pointed out, a great confusion and
divergence of opinion exists in the field of legal philosophy
as related to crime and penology. There is no idea or theory
which does not have its proponents and faithful adherents
and since it is a field where no evaluation is possible because
there is no basis upon which the various theories and opin-
ions can be measured except other theories and opinions, it
is only by the force of the number of its adherents that one
theory could be raised above the level of the others. Any at-
tempt at strict classification would therefore be an impossible
task. However, there are certain fundamental points of de-
parture between the attitude with which the law treats crime
and the attitude with which, the critics of the law contend,
crime should be treated. The theories of these critics are
usually classified into the extreme and the moderate views,
depending more or less upon the degree of difference exist-
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ing between the law and what they would have the law to
be. For present purposes no attempt at classification is
made, but the points of variance are considered in an at-
tempt to discover in what the difference of opinion consists.
A. Criminal Responsibility
The criticisms which the psychiatrists direct toward the
law are not of a superficial or procedural nature only, but
go to the very foundation of the attitude of the law by at-
tacking the philosophical conceptions on which it is based."0 '
Admitting that the basis of criminal punishment is primarily
theoretical retribution or, in some cases, deterrence reinforced
by retribution, with the other purposes of punishment at-
taching as incidental bases only, the psychiatrists question
both the correctness of these views and the usefulness of
the policy which results. Without question, criminal re-
sponsibility is based on the idea that guilt attaches to wrong-
doing and punishment is therefore merited. The psychia-
trists question both of these conclusions.102
A great controversy rages between the mentallistic and
behavioristic psychologists, between the free-willists and
the determinists on the question of freedom of choice. The
criminal law is based on the idea of free-will 103 and before
retributive punishment may be inflicted on the ground of
moral guilt and in the name of moral justice, it is necessary
to assume that the accused in doing the act was a free moral
agent and might have done otherwise. The assumption is
that, confronted by two or more alternative courses of ac-
tion, the criminal is he who has deliberately chosen the il-
legal course and who by the same token could deliberately
have chosen the path of virtue. 04
101 George W. Wickersham, The Program of the Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement (1930) 55 Am. Bar Ass'n Rep. 212, 228.
102 "All punishment as such is unjust, since no action is good or bad, or
worthy of praise, blame, or repentance." Henry W. Ballantine, op. cit. supra
note 7, at p. 493.
103 Ascha.ffenburg, Crime and Its Repression (1866) 241 et seq.
104 S. Sheldon Glueck, Criminal Responsibility (1923) 14 Jour. Crim. Law
208.
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The contention of the determinists on the other hand is
that it is an observable fact that organisms, man and animal
alike, adjust themselves to their environments by means of
hereditary and habit equipments.' °5 These adjustments
may be adequate or they may be so inadequate that the
organism barely maintains its existence. Where crime is
committed, the individual has failed to attain the socially
acceptable minimum.'0 6 The contention is made that some
individuals, who are sufficiently unfortunate to be born into
unfavorable surroundings, with drunken, shiftless or loose-
moralled parents and a low degree of intelligence or even
a taint of insanity as a birthright, with the street and dens
of vice as their only agency of education, and murder, lust,
rapine, crime, and laziness their only acquired knowledge,
are inevitably bound to a career of crime and must of nec-
essity become criminals. It is not contended that choice
is removed from them, for no doubt they have the power to
choose, but that, being what they are, the result of the
exercise of the power of choice is preordained. 10 7
It may be possible that from a high metaphysical point
of vision, all acts are necessitated.' 8 But the question is
largely metaphysical and as in the case of the question of
right and wrong in the abstract, without reference to cus-
tom, tradition or ethics, discussion is futile and leads no-
where. The law is a practical science and cannot be con-
cerned with such factors. If this view were followed either
all men would be exempt from responsibility or, arbitrarily,
the individuals who in any way interfered with the social
order would be segregated or destroyed, without reference
105 J. B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (1919).
106 S. Sheldon Glueck, op. cit. supra note 104, at p. 221.
107 "Each man's moral responsibility depends upon his conscience and each
man's conscience upon his education; consequently what would be morally right
in one man would be morally wrong in another." L. Vernon Briggs, Medico-
Legal Insanity (1923) 14 Jour. Crim. Law 62, 65.
308 Wharton, Philosophy of Criminal Law (1874).
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to whether they were merely potentially harmful or had
already done harmful acts. Briefly, behaviorism would do
away with criminal responsibility entirely by establishing
a strict cause and effect relationship. °9
It is certain that the position cannot be maintained, as
some free-willists contend, that the mind is absolutely free.
It is always subjected to outside influences and the assump-
tion of a chaotic freedom of some extra-personal entity is
impossible. However, the relationship of freedom of will,
in a metaphysical sense, to criminal responsibility is only
partial and vague. Freedom, as conceived today, does not
rule out such causative factors as heredity, constitution and
environment. Today the term means the capacity of a
human being to act creatively and purposefully, albeit un-
der the influence of motives and within certain necessary
limitations. This is the meaning with which the term is
used in the law."'
Closely akin to this question of freedom of will, but not
exactly the same, is the theory that crime is a disease and
a criminal offense is always a symptom of mental abnormal-
ity."' Under this theory, as the law stands at present, no
one could be punished." 2  As a corollary to this theory
stands the proposition that there is a particular criminal
type, a born criminal. Both of these ideas have now been
definitely exploded by daily experience 113 and by scientific
"109 "The violent and bloodthirsty members of society should be put out
of the way of further outrage without reference to the motive which induced
them to disregard the right of life and property; the laws of man should be ad-
ministered in the same spirit as are administered the laws of nature-a short-
sighted man who has miscalculated his distance in attempting to swim a river,
drowns; not because his motive is malignant but because he has violated a law.
Insanity, like blindness or a 'wicked or abandoned heart, is a defect of organi-
zation and the highest triumph of human tribunals should be to administer to
the survival of the fittest." Gilbert H. Stewart, Legal Medicine (1910) 391.
110 Op. cit. supra note 104.
111 Charles M. Jacobs, Crime and Insanity (1928) 46 Med.-Leg. Joui. 4.
112 Henry W. Ballantine, op. cit. supra n6te 7.
113 Brasol, The Elemen~s of Crime (1927) 286.
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research." 4 One startling discovery resulting from the data
compiled under the Briggs law in Massachusetts was that
only one out of every five of the prisoners examined were
reported abnormal." 5
The second criticism directed toward the basic principles
of the criminal law is that punishment for the sake of deter-
rence cannot be sufficiently supported by results,"' while re-
tributive punishment is not only useless but actually harm-
ful. The contention is that in returning evil for evil, the
first wrong is not only not undone, but a new wrong is per-
petrated. The psychiatrists, then, would discard the ortho-
dox theories of punishment as the principal and primary
aims "I and substitute in their place punishment based on
the theory of social utility."' The contention is that the
criminal law should be socialized." 9  The principle of state
action should be to secure such an organization of society
that in it all persons may have full opportunity to live their
largest lives. This is based on the idea that the state exists
for the benefit of the individual rather than the individual
for the state. 120 Insofar as the orthodox theories of punish-
ment were useful, they would be retained under the theory
of social utility. Thus retribution might be retained for
its service as an outlet for the indignation of the community
and for the elevation of the moral sense of the public at
114 Goring, The English Convict (1913) a symposium.
115 Winfred Overholser, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 602.
116 "Psychiatrists contend that criminality is a state of mind; that there
are people who because of either inherited or acquired defects are so unlike the
remainder of the community that they are asocial and hence criminal; that
they are morally color blind and cannot be taught a sense of duty to their fel-
lows." Charles W. Burr, Crime from a Psychiatrist's Point of View (1926)
16 Jour. Crim. Law. 519, 523.
117 "The more corrupt the defendant's heredity and the more defective his
mentality, the less his moral blame and punishability, but from a social stand-
point, the greater the necessity for sending him to a proper institution." Henry
W. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 7.
118 McConnell, op. cit. supra note 14, Ch. V.
119 H. Douglas Singer, Illinois Crime Survey (1929) Ch. XV.
120 A. Moresby White, Legal Insanity (1927) 18 Jour. Crim. Law. 165, 172.
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large. Prevention and reformation, where the possibility
of success existed, would also be useful; but the main 'out-
look would be the protection of society 121 and, when pos-
sible, to turn back into society social units which were capa-
ble of socially valuable functioning. 12  The particular aim
would be followed which in the particular case would have
the greatest social utility.'23
The beneficial result of such a change of fundamental
viewpoint would be to shift the focus of attention from the
criminal act to the criminal himself 124 and would substitute
treatment based upon diagnosis and scientific research 125 in
the place of punishment based upon philosophical concepts
which are the crystallization of customs and tradition and
121 "First comes the public welfare and the public safety. Second comes
the care of the innocent victim of the criminal act. Lastly we should deal with
the accused party." A. Moresby White, op. cit. supra note 120, at p. 174.
122 Karl A. Menninger, Medico-Legal Proposals (1928) 19 Jour. Crim. Law
367.
123 "No provision is made for abnormals in the present social scheme; when
we realize that there are two kinds of criminals, the sick and the normal, we
have gone a long way in the handling of crime. Punishment in the usual way
provided by law may be all right for the normal but certainly it is not the
proper remedy for the other class. The mentally sick should be sent to a hospital
and if found incurable, let us resort to the old punishment of banishment, not
banishment to a foreign country but banishment to a hospital, farm, or colony
where they can be properly treated and restrained." Dwight G. McCarty, op. cit.
supra note 28, at p. 418.
124 "The criminal and not the crime should be made the matter of prime
consideration and the sentence, or better, the decision of the court should be
calculated to cure the illness as it has been shown to exist in the conduct of the
defendant." L. Vernon Briggs, op. cit. supra note 107.
"To the psychiatrist the criminal act is of secondary importance; the mental
make-up impelling him to do it is the primarily important thing. The act there-
fore is merely a symptom to be interpreted; in law the act itself is the thing
which makes a man a criminal." Charles W. Burr, op. cit. supra note 116.
125 "Great as our achievements have been in the mechanics of life, remark-
able and astonishing as have been our attainments in the material world, we are
still as barbarians in the field of social relations and mutual human understanding.
We have not failed to apply every new invention and device in the direction
of improved business, commerce, and navigation, but we have failed miserably
to apply with the same eagerness and enthusiasm, the latest scientific findings
regarding the improvement of human relations. Science in its various fields has
made many contributions pointing the way out of darkness-into the light of
increased human understanding. But as yet we have hardly begun to apply the
wealth of material already at hand." Dr. Samuel Kohs, Annual Report of Twenty
First Annual Conference of the National Probation Assn. (1927) 173.
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the outgrowth of historical development. 26 Anti-social con-
duct would be treated in as unprejudiced and dispassionate
a manner as a broken leg. 2' The criminal would be re-
formed if possible, disabled by segregation when required,
or executed when necessary. 2 Such treatment, based on
the individual characteristics of the criminal would necessi-
tate the discarding of the concept of justice, since it would
necessarily eliminate the fixed penalty and the cut-to-the-
same-pattern treatment of all criminals who commit the
same offense.'29 One of the chief criticisms of the law to-
day, from a psychiatric viewpoint, is that it is too lenient
with some and too severe with other offenders, 3 ' due to the
fact that the punishment is inflicted according to the name
of the crime rather than the character of the man com-
mitting it.' 3 '
Along with the concept of justice and the fixed penalty,
the theory of punishment based upon social utility would re-
126 Op. cit. supra note 122.
127 H. Douglas Singer, op. cit. supra note 119, at p. 737.
128 "Psychiatrists and psychiatric work contemplate the making of an esti-
mate of future behavior. The main problem confronting the psychiatrist is
whether or not the subject is likely to become a menace to himself or society."
Samuel T. Orton, Annual Conference of National Probation Ass'n, op. cit. supra
note 125.
129 "The infliction of punishment is to be considered a clinic designed to
combat a social and individual malady, rather than the verification of a threat
of retribution which hangs over the head of wrongdoers." Henry W. Ballantine,
op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 493.
130 Winfred Overholser, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 607.
131 "The patient should be treated and not the disease and it is as illogical
to sentence the person who has committed a certain offense to a specific term of
imprisonment as it would be to decide, when a patient is admitted to the hospital,
the day on which he shall be discharged." H. Douglas Singer, op. cit. supra note
119, at p. 737.
"It is just as sensible to open the doors of the county hospitals for the
chronic insane and permit the inmates to leave, as to allow the defective delin-
quent to be turned out of prison to commit new crimes." Frank C. Richmond,
Psychiatry and the Criminal, (1926) 43 Med.-Leg. Jour. 39, 50.
"Ex-governor Cox of Ohio stated that it was a travesty on human intelligence
to sentence a habitual criminal to one, two or three years in the penitentiary;
and that it was a crime to release a known criminal back into society. The
really big lesson which criminology must teach the law is that some competent
authority ought to pass on the safety of turning the criminal loose." John F. W.
Meagher, Psychiatry and the Criminal (1926) 43 Med.-Leg. Jour. 68.
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quire the concept of criminal responsibility to be discarded.
From the viewpoint of psychiatry, the concept of responsi-
bility is academic and metaphysical and merely clouds the
issue.11 2  The test of responsibility would be the ability
to live in accordance with the social law and a violation of
the law would be evidence of unfitness for a social existence
regardless of the reason for its violation, and the underlying
reason, instead of being the basis on which responsibility
is determined would rather be a matter for consideration
in regard to the treatment to be applied." 8'
B. Insanity
Disregarding the more fundamental difference in the at-
titudes with which psychiatry and the law look upon the
problem of crime and the purposes of punishment and ac-
cepting the viewpoint of the law that moral guilt and crimi-
nal responsibility are inseparably connected, there is still a
further conflict on the question of determining when respon-
sibility should attach in the case where the accused is of
unsound mind. This conflict arises out of the criticisms
of psychiatry which question the adequacy of any test for
the determination of the criminal responsibility of insane
persons and in particular the correctness of the test which
is in use at the present time.
As has been indicated, the legal test for the responsibility
of persons who set up insanity as a defense to crime is the
knowledge of right and wrong as contained in the McNaugh-
ton rules, promulgated in 1843.' The contentions of the
132 Charles W. Burr, op. cit. supra note 116.
133 Singer and Krohn, op. cit. supra note 100, at p. 413.
134 McNaughton's Case, op. cit. supra note 78:
Q: "What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons
afflicted with insane delusion in resliect of one or more particular sub-
jects or persons; as, for instance, where at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did
the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion,
of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of
producing some supposed public benefit?"
A: "Assuming that your lordship's inquiries are confined to those per-
sons who labor under such partial delusions only, and are not in other
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psychiatrists are that the McNaughton rules were not the
result of reasoning from fundamental principles of law re-
garding criminal responsibility but simply arose from the
necessity of the case and were based upon its particular
facts and evidence. Morever, the rules were not only pro-
mulgated at a time when the medical profession had but a
very narrow view of the scope and character of mental dis-
orders, 3 ' but the rules themselves expressed still older medi-
cal opinion." 6
The first criticism advanced against this test is applica-
ble from a strictly legal point of view and is directed to their
authoritative effect because of their extra-judicial nature. 13 7
Whatever may have been the value of this argument had it
been raised in 1843, it has certainly been overcome by the
force of judicial precedent since that time and is therefore
untenable. However, it will be noticed from an examina-
tion of the questions, that they refer to persons afflicted
with insane delusions in respect to one or more particular
subjects of persons. The answers are based on the assump-
tion that the questions refer to persons afflicted with partial
delusions and who are not in other respects insane. The
rule, then, was the conclusion drawn from the premise that
a person so afflicted was otherwise perfectly sane; a view
respects insane, we are of the opinion that, notwithstanding the party
accused did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of in-
sane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury
or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according
to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of commit-
ting such crime that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression
we understand your lordship to mean the law of the land."
Q: "If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits
an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?"
A: "Making the same assumption that we did before, namely that he
labors under such partial delusion only and is not in other respects insane,
we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility
as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real."
135 Edwin R. Keedy, op. cit. supra note 9.
136 Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925) 76.
1 7 Meredith, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 29.
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entirely in accord with the psychology of the time, which
regarded the functions of the brain as divided into distinct
parts, each of which had 'considerable independence of the
others.'
The theory of partial insanity in the sense of monomania
has been entirely refuted and no longer exists."3 9 The pres-
ent day medical view is that insanity is a disease or dis-
order of the whole individual 140 and due to the fact that the
highest or governing regions are disordered, 4' the individual
is thereby rendered a changed being. The mind being a
unit,- a disease manifesting itself along one subject is a
disease of the whole mind and not of a part. Hence, de-
lusional insanity or monomania really is an indication of a
deep seated mental disorder and persons exhibiting such
symptoms are insane and not partially insane. Returning
to the McNaughton rules, the psychiatrists contend that
they are vitiated at their very outset because the answers,
by the strength of their own limitations in the assumptions
of the judges, apply to a mental condition which does not
exist, never existed, and could not exist.142
Secondly, under modern medical theory, the case would
be quite exceptional where a person could reason logically
from a delusion. Yet, assuming such a possibility to be the
case, and assuming that the answers of the judges were
meant to be responsive to the questions and not limited
as indicated above, the effect of rules laid down to cover
the case of delusional insanity would be no greater than
that of the legal rules already obtaining with respect to mis-
138 Edwin R. Keedy, op. cit. supra note 9.
139 "We cannot regard any part of the mind as being affected alone. Mind
is not a thing to be divided into parts." Stoddart, Mind and Its Disorders (5th ed.)
174.
, "To the medical man the use of the term partial insanity is as ridiculous as
to say a patient has a 'touch of pneumonia' or to diagnose a case as partial
pregnancy." Singer and Krohn, op. cit. supra note 100, at p. 216.
140 Henry Wiehofen, op. cit. supra note 90, at p. 508.
141 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 102, 103.
142 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, Ch. VIII.
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take of fact. The only effect given to the presence of in-
sanity is that it would allow the accused to entertain de-
lusions which would in the ordinary person fall under the
head of unreasonable mistake of fact, and would, as a re-
sult of the unreasonableness, afford no defense.
143
Thirdly, modern medical theory does not regard insanity
itself as a disease but as a symptom of disease 144 which
may manifest itself by disorders of conduct, disorders of
bodily function or disorders of the mind.145  Assuming the
McNaughton rules to have the greatest possible effect that
directive responsive answers could have, they abstract only
one phase of mental life and apply only to a particular and
specific mental disorder, delusional insanity. Yet in the
courts they have been applied as tests for every possible
phase of mental disorder without respect to whether it is
functional, intellectual or behavioristic, whether the delu-
sions present were partial or total or whether delusions were
present or not.14 The result of such application is to
make the knowledge of right and wrong, in all cases the
determining factor.
Modern medical authority is convinced that the "right
and wrong" test of responsibility is inadequate because it is
applicable only to those conditions of the mind in which
a defect of intelligence is primarily involved, such as paresis,
senile dementia, and feeble-mindedness.147  The test is
based on the assumption that knowledge controls conduct, 48
although it is a well established psychiatric principle that
143 "An insane delusion with reference to the conduct and attitude of an-
other cannot excuse the criminal act, unless it is of such character, that if it
had been true it would have rendered the crime excusable." People v. Taylor,
138 N. Y. 398, 406, 34 N. E. 275 (1893).
144 Singer and Krohn, op. cit. supra note 100, at p. 408.
145 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 109.
146 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 205.
147 William J. Hickson, Understanding Criminals (1918) 2 Jour. Am.
Judicature Society 69.
148 S. Sheldon Glueck, Psychiatry and The Law (1927) 14 Va. Law. Rev.
155, 168.
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behavior is in many instances controlled by the emotions.' 49
Psychiatrists contend that the brain is composed of two
parts, the cortex or reasoning mind, and the medulla ob-
longata, which is the seat of the emotional centers. Be-
havior is in many instances the result of domination of the
upper regions of the brain by the lower or the suspension
of the activity of the upper regions so that the lower are
in control; and both of these conditions are produced by
emotional activity. 5 ' These conditions grade from mere
automatic control, where the individual is no lrore than an
automaton, through various degrees in which the upper
regions retain some control. It does not necessarily follow
that the individual will commit criminal acts while in this
state, but it does indicate that lack of self-control is possible
although the intellect is in no wise impaired ' and if crimi-
nal acts are committed, the contention is that the offender
should not be held responsible. It is in an attempt to
recognize these psychiatric principles that the law has been
extended in some states to include irresistible impulse.
While psychiatry has discarded the term "partial insanity"
in the sense of monomania as scientifically unsound, the
term is nevertheless retained to indicate a general mental
impairment which is partial in that it is not so complete as
to come within the definition of insanity which relieves from
criminal responsibility. The distinction is between insanity
"partial as to thing" and insanity "partial as to degree." 152
The failure to make this distinction has been the source
of some confusion.' 53 From a strictly medical viewpoint,
if it is assumed that the brain is the seat of the mind or
that the mind is no more than cerebral activity, and that
all normal mental phenomena are regarded as the result of
149 Dwight G. McCarty, op. cit. supra note 39.
150 John R. Oliver, Emotional States (1920) 11 Jour. Crim. Law 77.
151 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 218.
152 Henry Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 90, at p. 503; Glueck, Studies in
Forensic Psychiatry (1916) 132.
153 State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 Pac. 167 (1909).
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a healthy brain, while abnormal phenomena are the result
of a diseased or deranged brain, then the condition of a
particular individual may be designated as either sanity or
insanity, with no middle ground, for the brain must be either
healthy or unhealthy.' However, such an omnibus defi-
nition is entirely useless for legal purposes. Even from a
medical viewpoint it is impossible to carve the world into
two parts, putting on one side those who are sane and on
the other those who are insane, just as it might be said that
all those in the cemetery are dead while those outside the
cemetery are living.'55 Insanity is a matter of degree and
those who are insane are not necessarily entirely insane,
as is true in the case of death.'56 Between the two extremes
of sanity and insanity lies every shade of disordered or defi-
cient mental condition, grading imperceptibly one into an-
other.
In law, on the other hand, insanity is synonymous with
irresponsibility. 57 The law must draw a hard and fast line
between sanity and insanity, for the question at issue is the
determination of whether or not the accused is responsible.
Hence the arbitrary legal tests for insanity are, in reality,
tests for irresponsibility,'58 since the accused either is suffi-
ciently insane to be excused or he is not. Psychiatrists
contend that even the test of irresistible impulse is inade-
quate and that what is really needed is a provision for
partial responsibility or degrees of responsibility to corre-
spond to degrees of insanity. 5 ' This, of course, cannot be
done under the present system and as a result a lack of
'54 Gilbert H. Stewart, Legal Medicine (1910) 354.
155 Henry Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 90.
156 "The naive popular idea that the insane are a degenerate species quite
apart from the normal quietly disappears. In its place rises the conception that
the frontier between what, in a given culture is supposed to be normal and what is
supposed to be abnormal is not a cliff but a slope." Harold D. Lawswell, The Study
of The Il1 (1929) 23 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 996, 1001.
157 John F. W. Meagher, Crime and Insanity (1923) 14 Jour. Crim. Law. 46.
158 John F. W. Meagher, Crime and Insanity (1923) 41 Med.-Leg. Jour. 63.
159 Henry Weihofen, op cit. supra note 90, at p. 512.
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harmony must always exist on any test of legal insanity
which demands a fixed and arbitrary classification with the
various classes divided by an unbending line.
From what has been said it would seem that very little
defense of the criminal law could be advanced. However,
the crux of the matter and the root of all the evils, lies in
the fact that the question of mental abnormality or defi-
ciency is fundamentally within the province of medicine 160
and cannot be reduced to the fixity demanded and required
by legal rules, and thus simplified and catalogued. 6' In-
sanity really has no definite meaning among medical men
and properly speaking has no place in scientific medicine.'62
The term insanity is a generic popular term and takes on a
definite meaning only when used in law to determine re-
sponsibility.
Because of the very nature of the subject, psychiatrists
are out of patience with the procedure of the criminal law,
nor may their criticisms be deemed wholly unreasonable and
unwarranted. In the first place, under the present system,
the determination of the very perplexing problem of mental
condition is left in the hands of the jury under instructions
from the court. Both the court and jury, however, are
manifestly unfit to make such a determination by their
total lack of training.' 3 For the purpose of assisting the
jury in this duty, the expert is called in, but it is obvious
from what has been said above that the psychiatrist is dis-
qualified by his training from assisting in matters which con-
160 "Lawyers and physicians mean two different things by the word 'mad-
ness.' A lawyer means conduct of a certain character. A physician means a certain
disease, one of the effects of which is to produce such conduct." Stephen, op. cit.
supra note 71, at p. 87.
161 Dwight G. McCarty, op. cit. supra note 123.
162 "Insanity is not really the name of any disease; it is not a diagnosis,
it is not in itself even a symptom; in fact it is an expression having various and
diverse meanings and signifies nothing definitely." Frank M. Woodbury Relation
Between Insanity and Crime (1913) 4 Jour. Crim. Law 282.
163 S. Sheldon Glueck, Psychiatric Examination (1927) 36 Yale Law Jour.
632, 648.
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cern responsibility. To him mental abnormality is not com-
mensurate with legal irresponsibility." 4 In others words, he
does not talk in the same language as the jury because the
terms change in meaning in their communication from the
expert to his listeners. As a result, his assistance is valu-
able, not in determining the criminal responsibility of the
accused, but in advising as to the final disposition of the case.
Assuming, however, that the psychiatrist does speak in
terms of legal responsibility for the assistance of the jury,
the use of the hypothetical question practically destroys
the value of his assistance. He is not allowed to express an
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the accused 165 but
is required to testify in answer to a hypothetical question
submitted to him by counsel and in his answer he is re-
quired to assume that the hypothesis is true. The unreality
of the situation is obvious and the result necessarily is that
the doors are thrown open to partisanship. In the first
place, skillfully framed questions are put which permit of
neither a directly positive nor negative answer, but the
psychiatrist is not allowed to explain.'66 Secondly, it is not
only possible, but usual, to frame questions in such a way
that the psychiatrist, being required to assume that the
hypothesis is true, must give the answers desired. Ob-
viously, the result of such a method of procedure is to get
expert testimony which arrives at directly contradictory con-
clusions, although the expert may in each case be not only
honest but correct in the conclusion reached.'67 However,
the jury, who are unable to distinguish such nice refine-
ments and subtleties, are misled into the perfectly natural
but entirely erroneous assumption that the question in each
case applies directly to the accused. As a matter of fact, it
164 Karl A. Menninger, Medico-Legal Proposals (1928) 19 Jour. Crim. Law.
367.
16. Singer and Krohn, op. cit. supra note 100, at p. 407.
166 Winfred Overholser, Psychiatry and The Law (1928) 13 Mass. Law Quar.
28, 35.
167 Singer and Krohn, op. cit. supra note 100, at pp. 375, 377.
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may apply, in whole or in part, in both or neither of the
cases. The situation is exactly analogous to the case of
the blind men who upon meeting with an elephant for the
first time, arrived at entirely different conclusions as to its
character because they came in contact with different parts
of its body. The net result of the whole procedure is to
arouse the impatience of the public at large with everyone
concerned in the trial and to bring both the law and psychia-
try into disrepute.16
In conclusion, the viewpoint of psychiatry may be sum-
marized in the following general propositions:
(1) The treatment of crime should be approached from
a scientific rather than a historical viewpoint.
(2) The underlying basis of treatment should be social
utility rather than retributive punishment.
(3) The concepts of justice and criminal responsibility
should be abolished to make way for a treatment
of the criminal rather than the crime.
(4) Until such time as the viewpoint may be changed,
modern psychiatrical knowledge should be used to
determine criminal responsibility in the place of
outworn legal concepts which express the faulty
knowledge of other times.
(5) The criminal procedure should be modified and re-
formed to eliminate partisanship and the hypothet-
ical question.
168 "The defendant having decided upon his defense will bring forward
experts to substantiate it and will have none others; the state on the other hand
only calls in experts who will denounce the theory of the defense as utterly
untenable. On both sides the experts air their theories and show the absurdity
of the theories advanced by the other side. And all this not merely for the
sake of having a discussion but to enable the jury to determine whether a man
shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property. The jury hears these conflicting
theories; there is no court of experts to say which is correct and it therefore
devolves upon the court trying the particular case to instruct the jury as to
which of these theories the law regards as tenable." Gilbert H. Stewart, op. cit.




It is evident that with such fundamental and far-reaching
differences of opinion existing, a real problem is presented.
Without question the problem of the recidivist is one of the
greatest in the treatment of crime today and the habitual
criminal or repeater is a crying illustration of the inade-
quacy of our laws as they are. 6 ' Furthermore, it is a known
fact that there are some special criminals, insane enough
never to go to prison and yet wise enough never to remain
long in an insane asylum.' ° On the other hand, it requires
a good actor to successfully feign insanity, but there are
many common varieties of mental disease which may and
very often do escape ordinary observation.'
Manifestly, the psychiatrists are correct in their asser-
tion that social utility should be the basis for the treatment
of crime. No good purpose is served by retributive punish-
ment. Not only is such a motive unworthy of both the
individual and the state, but the results are actually harm-
ful in many respects. No doubt the scientific approach is
the better method. However, it must be remembered that
there is a distinction between what is and what ought to be
the law. And a further distinction exists between what the
law should be and what it can be.
While it may be asserted that the scientific approach is
the better method, the historical origin and growth of the
law, and its close connection with individual and social
sentiment, cannot be entirely disregarded. The law must
concern itself with society, and it must reflect as closely
as possible the average moral tone as represented by the
mean of the aggregate of private consciences. While it
169 Wm. Healy, Studying the Offender (1913) 4 Jour. Crim. Law 204, 205.
170 John F. W. Meagher, Malingering In Criminals (1928) 45 Med.-Leg.
Jour. 78, 11 Va. L. Reg. 577, 590.
171 Henry W. Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 7.
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may be that the day of vindicative justice is passing, it is
true only with a qualification. It will never pass beyond
the possibility of a revival. The human vindicative instinct
in varying degrees will always remain not far below the sur-
face of habitual conduct. Both history and common sense
teach us that this is so and it is a fact which cannot be
ignored either in the criminal law or in criminology. It
requires only the intense feeling of the public, aroused by
the news of some particularly brutal or atrocious crime to
indicate such a revival. In some instances the fact of in-
sanity, in such an advanced, stage as to excuse even under
the present imperfect legal tests of criminal responsibility,
has been reasoned away by the jury that the sadistic de-
sires of the community might be satisfied.' 2 A further il-
lustration may be made of the now rather isolated cases of
mob justice. The gradual control of the vindicative im-
pulse arising from human weaknesses is one of the tests of
the progress of civilization and no savant is required to
tell us that the millennium has not been reached. More-
over, it cannot be said that the treatment of crime has been
entirely devoid of the scientific method, for its main char-
acteristic, the individualization of punishment, has been
recognized to a certain extent in the law today in the
development of reformatories, probation, and the indeter-
minate sentence.
Much of the criticism directed at the McNaughton rules
from the medical side is based upon a misapprehension.
They assume that the rules contain a definition of insanity.
And the legal definition thus obtained is contrasted with
the medical conception of insanity, implying a conception
of unsoundness of mind that is obsolete. It may be that
the judges who framed the McNaughton rules took into
consideration the medical view as to the nature of insanity
172 Winfred Overholser, Psychiatry and The Courts (1928) 19 Jour. Crim.
Law 79.
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generally accepted in 1843, if there was one. It is certain,
however, that they were not professing to define disease of
the mind, but only to define what degree of disease of the
mind negatived criminality. This is as much a legal ques-
tion as the question at what age a child becomes criminally
responsible. It undoubtedly is, and it is equally clear that
it ought to be the law, that not every kind or degree of
insanity should excuse from criminal responsibility.' 73 The
symptoms of insanity are the result of psychological phenom-
ena identical with those found in the normal mind, but
in the former the processes are carried to a more advanced
stage and beyond the limits which are generally regarded
as normal. 174  It is a matter of common knowledge that
there are many so-called "warped" individuals in any com-
munity, in whom there exists some taint of insanity, but
who are influenced by the ordinary fears and hopes that
control the conduct of ordinary people and who are there-
fore amenable to the criminal law. They should be no
more excused from the rigor of its penalties than they should
be declared incapable of executing a contract or a testamen-
tary document. 17  The far-reaching effect of granting im-
munity to everyone who is of unsound mind cannot be
realized until the medical conception of unsoundness of mind
is considered. 78  A man whose temper was intensely ex-
asperated by suppressed gout would not be excused for any
act of violence which he might commit in consequence, and
173 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 213.
174 Bernard Hart, Psychology of Insanity (1929) 140.
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if the disease were some obscure affection of the brain,
producing feelings similar in all respects, he would not be
excused merely because his complaint was classed as a form
of madness.' 77 Nor should a person who is bad by reason
of disease, unconnected with the particular acts which he
commits, be in a better position than the one who is bad
by birth, education, or natural character." 8 Even admitted
lunatics are capable of inhibitions and sublimations as is
indicated by the disciplinary methods used to control the
inmates of insane asylums. Certainly, then, every degree
of unsoundness of mind should not be a justification for
any crime which the individual chooses to commit," 9 and
the problem of drawing the line between responsibility and
irresponsibility devolves upon the criminal law. It is at
this point that the controversy between psychiatry and the
law for the most part exists, for the law even in its present
form is adequate in cases which are pronouncedly on one
side .or the other, when they are discovered. The borderline
cases do raise a practical problem 8 o but even here the clash
between the legal and medical conceptions for the most part
disappear when it is recognized that a person of unsound
mind may nevertheless be criminally responsible.'
It must be remembered that psychiatry itself is not well
settled, and the disagreements among psychiatrists are often
cited as arousing suspicion of their knowledge of the sub-
ject. 8 ' Our knowledge of our own minds is imperfect and
177 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 71, at p. 170
178 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 71, at p. 185.
179 Mercier, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 227 et seq.
180 John F. W. Meagher, op. cit. supra note 158, at p. 66 et seq.
181 "If criminals are to be permitted to roam through society at will, con-
fident that because of bad heredity, and vicious environment they are secured
against the penalties of the law, and when convicted of crime, they are for that
reason to be absolved from guilt and merely placed in a state supported educa-
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our knowledge of the precise mental condition of others
is still more imperfect. The courts are obliged to rely upon
the evidence furnished them by witnesses whose means of
knowledge are limited and who find great difficulty in com-
municating what they do know.' 83 Insanity is not a definite
entity like scarlet fever or tuberculosis, but is used to denote
a heterogeneous group of phenomena which have but little
in common. Moreover, its boundaries have varied from age
to age according to the dominating conceptions of the
period,' 84 and changing medical theories which are the re-
sult of progress to a fuller understanding are still too far
from perfect to warrant a change in the whole procedure
of the law.
The law changes slowly. There is always a gap between
the popular feelings, the passions of the hour and the per-
manent body of the law. The very permanency of the law
requires that before change is made, there must be assur-
ance that the law would be improved and that a practical
workable method would be introduced.' 85 Insanity is ad-
mittedly incapable of definition; its diagnosis is difficult and
its effect upon conduct obscure. Therefore care must be
used in making changes to be sure that they are based on
principles which are tested and true. However, it must
be pointed out that the fact that some difference of psychia-
tric opinion exists-a situation always found on the frontier
of a young science is no reason why the law should not
avail itself of the scientific facts upon which all are agreed
and which are susceptible of experimental proof. Legal an-
cester worship may be carried too far; and no real reason
exists why contemporary knowledge and practice should not
be substituted for the present out-of-date views. 8"
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Perhaps one of the greatest steps in the introduction of
modern, medical thought into the law is the Briggs law in
Massachusetts. Under this law, psychiatric examination be-
fore trial by state paid and neutral experts is made a matter
of routine. Where the medical experts reach the conclusion
that the offender is legally irresponsible, criminal proceed-
ings are usually dropped, although such a course is not re-
quired. The results under this method have been highly
successful and indicate the desirability of its extension187
One of the more important advantages of such service is
that it eliminates all partisanship and restores the expert
to the well recognized and respected position that he oc-
cupied as the friend of the court before he became a partisan
witness. Secondly, psychiatric examination is available in
all cases and is not limited only to capital offenses which
are probably the only cases where the defense would raise
the question of its own motion, inasmuch as the penalty of
the law would in most cases be less in degree than com-
mittment to an asylum.188  Thirdly, treatment of this dis-
covers defectives and insane persons early in their criminal
careers 189 and goes a long way toward solving the problem
of the recidivist, since experience and research indicate that
habitual offenders begin their careers early in life.19 As a
result, the attachment of a psychiatrical clinic to juvenile
courts has rather a wide application.
A similar expedient although not the same method is to
provide for examiners appointed by the court in cases where
the defense of insanity is raised. Although this does elim-
inate partisanship, it does not have the other advantages of
the Massachusetts system. However, the objection to this
method is that undue weight may be given to the testimony
of the experts and may militate against the defendant. It
187 Cornelius F. Collins, Psychiatric Clinic (1929) 19 Jour. Crim. Law 337.
188 Meredith, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 82.
189 Winfred Overholser, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 599 et seq.
190 Wickersham, op cit. supra note 101, at p. 224.
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has in some instances been declared unconstitutional on this
ground."' A third expedient which is urged is to limit
the jury to a determination of the fact question whether
or not the accused did the act complained of and leave
the question of mental condition for either the court or a
jury of experts. 9 '
In 1922, a committee was appointed in England by the
former Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, to consider what
changes were desirable in the law and procedure of criminal
trials where the plea of insanity was interposed. After re-
ceiving memoranda on the subject from the British Medical
Association, and the Medico-Psychological Association of
Great Britain and Ireland, the committee reported in Nov-
ember, 1923. In substance the report advocated the recog-
nition of the defense of irresistible impulse but except in
that particular, the McNaughton rules were retained. 93 In
the United States a similar committee representing the
American Bar Association, the American Medical Associa-
tion, the American Psychiatrical Association, and the Social
Science Research Council has been appointed, but no report
has as yet been submitted. 19
4
In the face of such whole hearted co-operation, it is likely
that the differences of opinion will be adjusted in some
measure, and some acceptable common ground will be
reached. No doubt the law will continue to lag behind the
more advanced thinkers of the time. This is always the
case, but as modern thought advances to greater heights,
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